Creation of backdoors in quantum communications via laser damage

Practical quantum communication (QC) protocols are assumed to be secure provided implemented devices are properly characterized and all known side channels are closed. We show that this is not always true. We demonstrate a laser-damage attack capable of modifying device behaviour on-demand. We test it on two practical QC systems for key distribution and coin-tossing, and show that newly created deviations lead to side channels. This reveals that laser damage is a potential security risk to existing QC systems, and necessitates their testing to guarantee security.Comment: Changed the title to match the journal version. 9 pages, 5 figure

Direct measurement of superluminal group velocity and of signal velocity in an optical fiber

We present an easy way of observing superluminal group velocities using a birefringent optical fiber and other standard devices. In the theoretical analysis, we show that the optical properties of the setup can be described using the notion of "weak value". The experiment shows that the group velocity can indeed exceed c in the fiber; and we report the first direct observation of the so-called "signal velocity", the speed at which information propagates and that cannot exceed c.Comment: 5 pages, 5 figure

Experimental plug and play quantum coin flipping

Performing complex cryptographic tasks will be an essential element in future quantum communication networks. These tasks are based on a handful of fundamental primitives, such as coin flipping, where two distrustful parties wish to agree on a randomly generated bit. Although it is known that quantum versions of these primitives can offer information-theoretic security advantages with respect to classical protocols, a demonstration of such an advantage in a practical communication scenario has remained elusive. Here, we experimentally implement a quantum coin flipping protocol that performs strictly better than classically possible over a distance suitable for communication over metropolitan area optical networks. The implementation is based on a practical plug&play system, designed for quantum key distribution. We also show how to combine our protocol with coin flipping protocols that are almost perfectly secure against bounded adversaries, hence enhancing them with a level of information-theoretic security. Our results offer a powerful toolbox for future secure quantum communications.Comment: Version 2, 19 pages including detailed security analysi